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.13 However, because of the persistent discriminationshortcomings of the system, the US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara decided againstdeployment and efforts were re-directed towards an improved version, Nike-X.14 Thisemployed a new phased-array radar and an additional low-altitude interceptor  Sprint ,whilst retaining Zeus (later  Spartan ) for high-altitude intercepts in a layered defence.InBritain the Ministry of Aviation noted that the nuclear heads made them most suitable forthe defence of hardened targets (such as ICBM silos), and assessed that  it is much tooearly to say whether a system will emerge which will justify the cost of its operationaldeployment.15The MoD s Long-Term Study Group s report on missile defence16 indicated acontinuing interest in the subject, even if research had largely been abandoned in Britain.The report identified what had become two distinct US requirements:  hard pointdefence (such as missile silos and command centres), and urban defence.As regards theformer, The successful development of such a system would be an important element inproviding a stable second-strike force. But for defence of cities,  there is notably lessenthusiasm for and confidence in a terminal intercept system.Soon after, a  hardeningof the United States s approach to release of information on BMD was reported.17 Thiswas especially so in the area of defence penetration.If exchanges were to continue, theUK needed to adopt a  quid pro quo approach, with something to offer.Such was theposition when the Wilson Labour Government came to power in October 1964.FROM COOPERATION TO CONCERNStarting in about 1958, doubts had begun to arise in the United States about the technicalfeasibility and strategic desirability of an ABM deployment.18 By 1963 McNamara hadbecome concerned about the implications for stable nuclear deterrence of ABM systems.His cost-effectiveness approach to defence led him to conclude that ABM systems couldnot be worthwhile.19 A possible reason for deployment arose in October 1964, however,with the first Chinese atomic test.Thereafter ABM issues were considered not just in thelight of the US-Soviet nuclear balance, but also with regard to a future more limitedthreat from  third parties  initially China.By early 1965, McNamara was considering whether the US Army s Nike-X systemshould be deployed.20 ABM deployment was the subject of Congressional hearings21 andcame to the attention of the Foreign Office in London.An immediate reaction was that the American decision could have a profound effect on British national security and onthe future of the Atlantic Alliance& we ought to make our views known to the Americansat the highest level in good time.22 The initial Foreign Office analysis proceeded incomplete ignorance of the earlier work done on the ABM problem in the UK, and theextensive consultations that had already taken place, albeit largely at a technical level,US ABM deployment 101with the Americans:  & I am fairly confident that the Americans have never seriouslyconsulted us& Nor am I aware that we have ever raised the subject with them. 23The Foreign Office s Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU)examined the ABM issue, coming to an early conclusion that because of the technical andfinancial impediments to a complete defence against ballistic missiles, the effects ofABM on the strategic balance might be overdrawn.24 Another official observed that itwas  in our interest, and in that of peace, that no third country, particularly China, shouldbe in a position to threaten effectively the homeland of the US, or even of the USSR.Hepresumably did not include Britain in the category of a  third country , but explicitly didinclude France.25The result of these early deliberations was a comprehensive report prepared for thePermanent Under-Secretary s Steering Committee, a sort of internal  think-tank [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]