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.BrigadierGeneral Harold B.Fiske, the head of the AEF training program encapsulated this viewperfectly when he remarked,  an American Army can not be made by Frenchmen or byEnglishmen. 19American WeaponsThe United States grudgingly accepted Allied aid in training its troops, but eager-ly requested help in arming them.In developing his training doctrine, Pershing placedheavy emphasis on the one weapon that the United States possessed in abundance theSpringfield Model 1903 rifle.Yet in 1918 most American troops ended up fighting withmodified British Enfield rifles because American factories were already producingthese rifles in large quantities for the British when the United States entered the war.For field artillery, both light and heavy guns, the United States quickly realized that itneeded help from the French armaments industry to supply the American army.Withthe French offering the Americans an ample supply of 75mm guns and 155mmhowitzers, as well an initial delivery of one million shells with subsequent dailyallotments of 30,000 75mm shells and 6,000 155mm shells, the War Department offi-cially adopted these as the field artillery pieces of the AEF on 9 June 1917.Americanarmaments manufacturers received licenses to build these guns, but the war endedbefore any American-produced 75mm or 155mm guns reached the Western Front.Pershing also turned to the French to provide machine guns.In July, the French gov-ernment agreed to provide Hotchiss machine guns and Chauchat automatic rifles for theinitial AEF contingents.The Americans depended on these weapons until September1918 when enough American-produced Browning machines guns and automatic riflesarrived at the front.In exchange for these munitions, the French received much-neededraw materials, especially steel, smokeless powder, brass, and high explosives.By the end of 1917, Britain and France pressed for a more active role in helpingprepare the American Army for combat.By then, the Second, 26th, and 42nd Divisionshad joined the First Division in France, bringing the total to 200,000 of the 2 milliontroops who would eventually travel to France.These scant numbers were not enough, inthe eyes of the Allies, to help repel the expected German spring attacks.The slowTHE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 17progress in forming the American army dismayed the Allies. The raising of new armiesis a tremendous task for any country, wrote General William Robertson to the BritishWar Cabinet,  and although one might expect that America, with her two previous expe-riences, and her supposed great business and hustling qualities, would do better thanother countries, the fact is she is doing very badly.My general impression is thatAmerica s power to help us win the war that is, to help us to defeat the Germans inbattle is a very weak reed to lean upon at present, and will continue to be so for a verylong time to come unless she follows up her words with actions much more practicaland energetic than any she has yet taken. 20 General Philippe Pétain echoed these sen-timents more diplomatically during a Supreme War Council Meeting in January, statingthat  the American army, if it wished to retain its autonomy, would be of no use to theAllies in 1918, except, perhaps, along some quiet section of the front. 21 Even Pershinglater professed  much embarrassment over the failure to make a greater contributionto the fighting along the Western Front in 1917.22When the expected German offensives came in March, the German Army put intopractice many of the tenets of open warfare advocated by Pershing.In the days precedingthe attack, the Germans limited their use of heavy artillery bombardments to destroybarbed wire entanglements and soften up the opposing army.The Germans realized thatthe massive bombing traditionally used to launch an attack effectively alerted the otherside that an attack was coming and created huge craters in No Man s Land for attackingtroops to negotiate.This time, small infantry teams advanced under artillery cover, andgot past strongly defended front lines [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]