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.This would be much more likely to take place in the event ofreactionary movements being successful in each of the twocountries, whereas an effective unity of purpose between Leninand the present essentially middle-class government of Germany isunthinkable.On the other hand, the same people who fear such aunion are even more afraid of the success of Bolshevism; and yetthey have to recognise that the only efficient forces forfighting it are, inside Russia, the reactionaries, and, outsideRussia, the established forces of order and authority in Germany.Thus the advocates of intervention in Russia, whether direct orindirect, are at perpetual cross-purposes with themselves.Theydo not know what they want; or, rather, they want what theycannot help seeing to be incompatibles.This is one of thereasons why their policy is so inconstant and so exceedinglyfutile.The same conflict of purpose is apparent in the attitude ofthe council of the Allies at Paris towards the present governmentof Germany.A victory of Spartacism in Germany might well be theGet any book for free on: www.Abika.comTHE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE126prelude to revolution everywhere: it would renew the forces ofBolshevism in Russia, and precipitate the dreaded union ofGermany and Russia; it would certainly put an end to anyexpectations which have been built on the financial and economicclauses of the treaty of peace.Therefore Paris does not loveSpartacus.But, on the other hand, a victory of reaction inGermany would be regarded by everyone as a threat to the securityof Europe, and as endangering the fruits of victory and the basisof the peace.Besides, a new military power establishing itselfin the East, with its spiritual home in Brandenburg, drawing toitself all the military talent and all the military adventurers,all those who regret emperors and hate democracy, in the whole ofEastern and Central and south-eastern Europe, a power which wouldbe geographically inaccessible to the military forces of theAllies, might well found, at least in the anticipations of thetimid, a new Napoleonic domination, rising, as a phoenix, fromthe ashes of cosmopolitan militarism.So Paris dare not loveBrandenburg.The argument points, then, to the sustentation ofthose moderate forces of order which, somewhat to the world'ssurprise, still manage to maintain themselves on the rock of theGerman character.But the present government of Germany standsfor German unity more perhaps than for anything else; thesignature of the peace was, above all, the price which someGermans thought it worth while to pay for the unity which was allthat was left them of 1870.Therefore Paris, with some hopes ofdisintegration across the Rhine not yet extinguished, can resistno opportunity of insult or indignity, no occasion of loweringthe prestige or weakening the influence of a government with thecontinued stability of which all the conservative interests ofEurope are nevertheless bound up.The same dilemma affects the future of Poland in the rolewhich France has cast for her.She is to be strong, Catholic,militarist, and faithful, the consort, or at least the favourite,of victorious France, prosperous and magnificent between theashes of Russia and the ruin of Germany.Roumania, if only shecould be persuaded to keep up appearances a little more, is apart of the same scatter-brained conception.Yet, unless hergreat neighbours are prosperous and orderly, Poland is aneconomic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting.And whenPoland finds that the seductive policy of France is purerhodomontade and that there is no money in it whatever, norglory either, she will fall, as promptly as possible, into thearms of somebody else.The calculations of 'diplomacy' lead us, therefore, nowhere.Crazy dreams and childish intrigue in Russia and Poland andthereabouts are the favourite indulgence at present of thoseEnglishmen and Frenchmen who seek excitement in its leastinnocent form, and believe, or at least behave as if foreignpolicy was of the same genre as a cheap melodrama.Let us turn, therefore, to something more solid.The Germangovernment has announced (30 October 1919) its continued adhesionto a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs ofRussia, 'not only on principle, but because it believes that thispolicy is also justified from a practical point of view'.Let usassume that at last we also adopt the same standpoint, if not onprinciple, at least from a practical point of view.What are thenthe fundamental economic factors in the future relations ofGet any book for free on: www.Abika.comTHE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE127Central to Eastern Europe?Before the war Western and Central Europe drew from Russia asubstantial part of their imported cereals.Without Russia theimporting countries would have had to go short.Since 1914 theloss of the Russian supplies has been made good, partly bydrawing on reserves, partly from the bumper harvests of NorthAmerica called forth by Mr Hoover's guaranteed price, but largelyby economies of consumption and by privation.After 1920 the needof Russian supplies will be even greater than it was before thewar; for the guaranteed price in North America will have beendiscontinued, the normal increase of population there will, ascompared with 1914, have swollen the home demand appreciably, andthe soil of Europe will not yet have recovered its formerproductivity.If trade is not resumed with Russia, wheat in1920-1 (unless the seasons are specially bountiful) must bescarce and very dear.The blockade of Russia lately proclaimed bythe Allies is therefore a foolish and short-sighted proceeding;we are blockading not so much Russia as ourselves.The process of reviving the Russian export trade is bound inany case to be a slow one.The present productivity of theRussian peasant is not believed to be sufficient to yield anexportable surplus on the pre-war scale [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]