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.Although initially sympathetic to the Cuban revolution,Kennedy had come to see Castro as the Latin American vanguardof Khrushchev’s plans to promote communism globally.The presi-dent’s response to this challenge was the Alliance for Progress, a massive development program for the continent that he unveiled in March.He was also wary of committing the United States overtly in toppling Castro.The CIA therefore turned what had been aconventional invasion centered on U.S.forces into an operation by Cuban exiles with the minimum possible American support.TheState Department and some senior advisors continued to voice op-183reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 184sum m i t sposition but over the Easter weekend of April 1–3, the president made up his mind.He spent the break at his father’s house in Palm Beach, Florida, and returned to Washington on the 4th fired up with determination.Exactly what tipped the balance is not clear but various factors played a part.The CIA, backed by the joint chiefs of staff, had now made the plan politically acceptable and the veteran CIA director, Allen Dulles, assured Kennedy that its prospects were even better than those for Guatemala in 1954.An inexperienced new president would find it hard to demur.In any case Kennedy wanted Castro overthrown, and the operation appealed to his sense of daring.A weekend with his macho father probably had an effect.While at Palm Beach Kennedy received Ambassador Thompson’s telegramconfirming Khrushchev’s willingness to meet in Vienna after his Paris trip at the end of May.With the road to the summit now open, Kennedy perhaps felt freer to deal with the problem of Castro.62The CIA’s critics were still not convinced.Arthur Schlesinger, the Harvard historian who was special assistant to the president, presciently warned that the plan would probably fall between two stools.“No matter how ‘Cuban’ the equipment and personnel, the U.S.will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success.” At the same time, without real American firepower, the operation would fail to topple Castro and would “turn into a protracted civil conflict.”63Schlesinger was right.A “deniable plan” led to an “undeniable fiasco.”64 Landing on the remote Bay of Pigs on April 17 with virtually no air support, the Cuban exiles crumbled within a couple of days.By April 19 Kennedy could conceal neither their failure nor American involvement.Publicly and with dignity he accepted “sole responsibility.”65 But in private his mood was angry and distressed; on several occasions he could not control his tears.Acute diarrhea and another urinary tract infection added to his misery.Bobby Kennedy, the president’s brother and now attorney general, berated JFK’s inner circle: “All you bright fellows have got the President into this, and if you don’t do something now, my brother will be regarded as a paper tiger by the Russians.”66184reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 185v i e nna 19 61On April 18, 1961, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a fierce messagecasting doubt on his professed wish to improve relations and warning that “any so-called ‘little war’ can touch off a chain reaction in all parts of the globe.” Kennedy fired back a robust reply about the right of the Cuban people to seek freedom from “the Castro dictatorship,” only to receive a long and rambling lecture dated April 22about “the very dangerous road” he was treading.67In May 1960 the U-2 fiasco had given Khrushchev justificationfor sabotaging the Paris summit and the Kennedy administration recognized that this could happen again.In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy could not seem too eager for a meeting—that might look like appeasement.But if he backed away from the proposed encounter, it would suggest he was a coward.And if the idea lapsed altogether, he would lose the chance to convince the Soviet leader that, despite Cuba, he was no soft touch.68 Whereas initially it was Khrushchev who had wanted a summit more than Kennedy, afterthe Bay of Pigs the balance was much more equal.On May 4 Moscow broke silence [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]